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Two prominent features of international labor movements are that the more educated are more likely
to emigrate (positive selection) and more-educated migrants are more likely to settle in destination
countries with high rewards to skill (positive sorting). Using data on emigrant stocks by schooling
level and source country in OECD destinations, we find that a simple model of income maximization
can account for both phenomena. Results on selection show that migrants for a source-destination
pair are more educated relative to non-migrants the larger is the absolute skill-related difference in
earnings between the destination country and the source. Results on sorting indicate that the relative
stock of more-educated migrants in a destination is increasing in the absolute earnings difference between
high and low-skilled workers. We use our framework to compare alternative specifications of international
migration, estimate the magnitude of migration costs by source-destination pair, and assess the contribution
of wage differences to how migrants sort themselves across destination countries.
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1.  Introduction 
  International migration is a potentially important mechanism for global economic 
integration.  As of 2005, individuals residing outside their country of birth accounted for 
3% of the world’s population.  Most of those migrants left home bound for rich nations.  
The UN estimates that in 2005, 40.9% of the global emigrant population resided in just 
eight rich economies,
1 with 20.2% living in the U.S. alone.  In major destination 
countries, the number of foreign born is rising, reaching 12.5% of the total population in 
the U.S., 11.2% in Germany, 10.5% in France, and 8.2% in the U.K. 
  One striking feature of international labor flows is that the more educated are 
those most likely to move abroad.  Using data from Docquier and Marfouk (2006) on 
emigration by schooling group, Figure 1 plots the share of tertiary-educated emigrants 
against the share of tertiary-educated non-emigrants by source country.  Emigrants are 
generally positively selected in terms of schooling; that is, that they are more educated 
than their non-migrant counterparts.  This observation has renewed interest in the impact 
of brain drain on developing economies.
2 
  A second – and perhaps less appreciated – feature of international migration is the 
sorting of emigrants across destinations.  Countries with high rewards to skill attract a 
disproportionate share of more-educated emigrants.  Table 1, also based on data from 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006), gives the share of international migrants residing in 
OECD countries by major destination region.  The U.S. and Canada, where skill-related 
wage differences are relatively large, receives 51 percent of the OECD’s immigrants, but 
                                                 
1 These countries are the US, Germany, France, Canada, the UK, Spain, Australia, and Italy.  Freeman 
(2006) notes that Russia and several Middle Eastern countries also receive large numbers of immigrants. 
2 Recent empirical work on brain drain includes Adams (2003), Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2007, 
2008), Docquier and Rapoport (2007), and Kapur and McHale (2005).   2
66 percent of its immigrants with tertiary schooling.  Europe, where skill-related wage 
differences are relatively small, receives 38 percent of the OECD’s immigrants, but only 
24 percent of its tertiary-schooled immigrants.  Europe’s failure to receive educated 
migrants may explain its recent efforts to attract skilled foreigners.
3 
  In this paper, we develop and estimate a simple model of migration based on the 
Roy (1951) income maximization framework.  The Roy model, which is the foundation 
for a large body of migration research (Borjas, 1999), implies that the selectivity of 
migrants and their sorting across destinations should depend on cross-country differences 
in the reward to skill.  Our version of the model predicts that an increase in the reward to 
skill in a destination should cause immigration from source countries to rise and the mix 
of migrants to become more skilled. 
The model delivers estimating equations for the scale of migration, the selection 
of migrants in terms of schooling, and the sorting of migrants across destinations by 
schooling.  While the three equations estimate a common coefficient on earnings, they 
differ in terms of the data they require and the assumptions one must impose regarding 
migration costs.  The scale regression requires data on earnings by schooling level in the 
source and destination and an assumption that the determinants of fixed migration costs 
are observable.  The selection regression differences out fixed migration costs.  The 
sorting regression does so as well, and also controls for source-specific determinants of 
migration, including source-country earnings.  We analyze newly available data from 
Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2007) on the stock of migrants by education level from 
192 source countries residing in OECD destination countries as of 2000. 
                                                 
3 See “Not the Ace in the Pack:  Why Europe Loses in the Global Competition for Talent,” The Economist, 
October 25, 2007.   3
  To preview the findings, the data strongly support income maximization.  In the 
scale regression, migration is increasing in the level earnings difference between the 
destination and the source, although the estimated effect of earnings appears to be 
attenuated due to omitted fixed costs of migration.  In the selection and sorting 
regressions, which difference out fixed costs, the relative stock of more-educated 
migrants is larger in destinations with greater skill-related earnings differences.  We also 
find post-tax earnings are a stronger correlate of migration than pre-tax earnings, 
consistent with migrants weighing tax treatment.  Further results address the role of 
language, distance, migration policy, historical relationships, and lagged migration. 
  One contribution of our paper is to address conflicting results on migrant 
selectivity.  In seminal work, Borjas (1987) develops a version of the Roy model which 
predicts that migrants who move from a country with high returns to skill to a destination 
with low returns to skill should be negatively selected.  Although the Borjas (1987) 
framework performs well in explaining migration from Puerto Rico to the U.S. (Ramos, 
1992; Borjas, 2006), it does less well elsewhere.  Migrants from Mexico to the U.S. are 
drawn from the middle of the skill distribution, even though returns to skill are higher in 
Mexico than the US.
 4 Figure 1 shows that OECD-bound migrants are positively selected, 
even though many are from countries where returns to skill exceed those in the OECD. 
  Our results suggest that one explanation for positive selection is that migrants are 
influenced by skill-related differences in wage levels, rather than relative returns to skill, 
which is consistent with cross-country differences in labor productivity being a dominant 
factor in why labor moves across borders.  In a world where wage level differences 
                                                 
4 See Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Orrenius and Zavodny (2005), McKenzie and Rapoport (2006), 
Ibararran and Lubotsky (2005), and Fernandez-Huertas (2006).   4
matter, high-skill workers from low-wage countries may have a strong incentive to 
migrate, even if returns to skill are high in the source country.  We also estimate an 
alternative version of the income maximization model in which relative returns, rather 
than wage level differences, influence migrant selectivity.
5  The data reject this model.  
  Our results on scale and selection are consistent with Rosenzweig (2007), who 
examines legal migration to the U.S. and finds that source-country emigration rates are 
decreasing in source-country labor productivity.  This is comparable to our finding that 
migration is increasing in the destination-source earnings difference by skill group.
6   
Relative to his work, we extend the analysis to multiple destinations, which enables us to 
analyze sorting as well as scale and selectivity and to account for the relative contribution 
of earnings and migration costs to international migration.  We use our scale regression to 
estimate the fixed costs of migration between 102 source countries and 15 destination 
countries, finding that these costs are large, often an order of magnitude greater than 
source-country earnings for low-skilled workers.  We use our selection regression to 
decompose emigrant selectivity into components attributable to wages differences and 
components attributable to migration costs by source region and income level.  
  A second contribution of the paper is to establish the independence of migrant 
selection and migrant sorting.  While the selectivity of migration by skill depends on the 
reward to skill in the source country, among other factors, the sorting of migrants by skill 
does not.  Positive sorting is a general implication of income maximization.  We provide 
the first evidence on the sorting of international migrants across destinations; previous 
                                                 
5  Other work on bilateral migration tends to use log per capita GDP to measure wages often with controls 
for income inequality.  See Volger and Rotte (2000), Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith (2004), Hatton and 
Williamson (2005), Mayda (2005), and Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007). 
6 In related work, Rosenzweig (2006) finds that the number of students who come to the U.S. for higher 
education and who then stay in the U.S. are decreasing in labor productivity in the source country.   5
studies of sorting focused on internal US migration (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1992; 
Dahl 2002). We use our sorting regression to decompose differences in immigrant skills 
across destination countries into components due to wage differences, language, distance, 
and other factors.  Skill-related wage differences are the dominant factor in explaining 
why the U.S. and Canada receive more skilled immigrants than other OECD destinations. 
  In section 2, we present a simple model of international migration and derive the 
estimating equations.  In section 3, we describe our data.  In section 4, we give the 
estimation results.  Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Theory and Empirical Specification 
A. A Model of Scale, Selection and Sorting in Migration 
  Consider migration flows between many source countries and many destination 
countries.  To be consistent with our data, assume that workers fall into one of three skill 
groups, corresponding to primary, secondary, or tertiary education.  Let the wage for 
worker i with skill level j from source country s in destination country h be
7 










ish δ + δ + μ = , 
where exp(μh) is the wage paid to workers with primary education,
2
h δ  is the return to 
secondary education, 
3
h δ  is the return to tertiary education, and 
j
is D  is a dummy variable 
indicating whether individual i from source s has schooling level j. 
Let  j
ish C  be the cost of migrating from s to h for worker i with skill level j, which 
we assume to have two components:  a fixed monetary cost common to all individuals 
                                                 
7 In (1), we do not allow for unobserved components of skill that may affect wages, which are of central 
concern in Borjas (1987, 1991).  Since our data on migrant stocks are aggregated by skill group and source 
country, it is not possible to address within group heterogeneity in skill.   6
who move from s to h, fsh; and a component that varies by skill group, 
j
sh g (which may be 
positive or negative), such that 
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Migration costs are influenced by the linguistic and geographic distance between the 
source and the destination and by destination-country immigration policies.  The impacts 
of these characteristics may depend on the migrant's skill due to time costs associated 
with migration or skill-specific immigration policies in the destination.  
Our primary interest is in a linear utility model where the utility associated with 
migrating from country s to country h is a linear function of the difference between 
wages and migration costs as well as an unobserved idiosyncratic term  j
ish ε  such that 







ish ) C W ( U ε + − α = ,  
where α > 0.  We think of (3) as a first-order approximation to some general utility 
function, with the marginal utility of income given by α.  One of the “destinations” is the 
source country itself, for which migration costs are zero. 
  Assuming that workers choose whether and where to emigrate so as to maximize 
their utility, and assuming that  j
ish ε  follows an i.i.d. extreme value distribution, we can 
write the log odds of migrating to destination country h versus staying in the source 
country s for members of skill group j as
8 
                                                 
8 The specification of the disturbance in equation (3) embodies the assumption that IIA applies among 
destination countries.  In the empirical analysis, the sample of destination countries is limited to OECD 
members.  To use (4) as a basis for estimation, we need only that IIA applies to the OECD countries in the 
sample.  The analysis is thus consistent with more complicated nesting structures, in which we examine 
only the OECD branch of the decision tree (one such structure would be in which individuals first choose 
to migrate or not migrate, migrants then choose either OECD or non-OECD sets of destination countries, 
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where 
j
sh E  is the population share of education group j in s that migrates to h,  j
s Ei s  t h e  




μ+ δ =  (McFadden 
1974).  Equation (4) speaks to the scale of migration.  It says that income maximization, 
together with our assumptions about utility and the error terms, implies that the skill-
group-specific log odds of migrating to h from s should depend positively on the level 
difference in skill-specific wages between h and s and negatively on migration costs. 
  To analyze emigrant selection, take the difference of equation (4) between 
tertiary- and primary-educated workers to yield: 
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The first term on the left side of (5) is a measure of the skill distribution of emigrants 
from source s to destination h, which we refer to as the log skill ratio.  The numerator is 
the share of tertiary-schooled workers in s who migrate to h, and the denominator is the 
share of primary-schooled workers in s who migrate to h.  The second term on the left of 
(5) is the log skill ratio for non-migrants in s, meaning the full expression on the left of 
(5) is the difference in skill distributions between emigrants (from s to destination h) and 
non-migrants for source country s. 
  If the left side of (5) is negative, emigrants are negatively selected; if it is positive, 
they are positively selected.  Since α > 0, equation (5) indicates that emigrants should be 
positively selected if the wage difference between the source and destination countries, 
                                                                                                                                                 
there are multiple branches of the decision tree even among OECD destinations, such that IIA fails.  In the 
estimation, we test for this possibility, following the logic of Hausman and McFadden (1984).    8
net of skill-varying migration costs, is greater for high-skill workers.  Emigrants should 
be negatively selected if the net source-destination wage difference is greater for low-
skill workers.  Note that fixed costs fsh do not appear in the selection equation (5).  
Differencing between skill groups has eliminated them from the expression. 
  To analyze the model’s implications for how emigrants should sort themselves 
across destinations, collect those terms in (5) that vary only by source country to yield 
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s s − α − = τ .  Fixed costs do not appear in the sorting equation 
(6) because they are absent from the selection equation (5). 
  Equation (6) expresses the key implication of utility maximization in the presence 
of multiple destinations.  Since α > 0, emigrants from a given source country should sort 
themselves across destinations by skill according to the rewards to skill in different 
destinations.  If the (net) rewards to skill are higher in destination h than in destination k, 
then destination h should receive a higher-skilled mix of emigrants from source country s 
than should destination country k.  Put differently, higher skill-related wage differences 
should give destination countries an advantage in competing for skilled immigrants. 
 
B. Relationship to Earlier Research 
  The model summarized in (4), (5), and (6) highlights the role of fixed costs and 
level wage differences in influencing the scale, selectivity, and sorting of migration 
flows.  In contrast, much of the literature focuses on relative returns to skill and assumes   9
migration costs are proportional to income (see Borjas, 1991 and 1999).  It is useful to 
compare these two models theoretically and empirically. 
  To do so, consider a log utility model where wages and migration costs are as 
before, but utility is given by  
(7)  
jj j j
ish ih ish ish U (W C ) exp( )
λ =− υ  
where λ > 0 and 
j
ish υ  follows an i.i.d. extreme value distribution.  The analogues to the 
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where  ()
jj j
sh sh sh h mf g / W =−  and 
31 3
ss s s ln(E /E ) ρ =− λ δ .
9  In the log utility model, the 
scale of migration is influenced by the relative wage difference between the source and 
destination countries (see (8)), and selectivity and sorting are functions of returns to skill, 
as given by the δ terms, rather than skill-related level wage differences (see (9) and (10)). 
  In the log utility model, differencing between skill groups does not in general 
eliminate either fixed or skill-varying migration costs from the selection or sorting 
equations in (9) and (10).  In the special case where skill-varying costs are proportional to 
wages, such that  j
h sh
j
sh W g π = , differencing between skill groups eliminates skill-varying 
                                                 
9 In deriving (8), we use the approximation that ln(W-C) ≈ lnW – C/W for sufficiently small C/W.  
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costs, but not fixed costs.  Since much of the literature has focused on models where 
skill-varying costs are assumed to be proportional to wages and fixed costs are assumed 
to be zero, it represents a case of special interest. 
  Examining conditions for migrant selectivity provides a useful way of comparing 
our linear utility model with fixed migration costs to the more standard log utility model 
with proportional migration costs.  To analyze our linear utility model, substitute the 
definition of  j
h W  into the right side of (5), rearrange terms, and make use of the fact that 
δ ≈ − δ 1 e .  Our linear utility model then predicts that emigrants should be negatively 













































In the special case where  0 g3
sh = , as would occur if fixed migration costs were 
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Now consider the log utility model where fixed costs are zero and skill-varying costs are 
proportional to wages.  Under these conditions, equation (9) shows that negative selection 
will obtain if  1 / 3
h
3
s > δ δ , as in Borjas (1987).   
  The two models make similar predictions about migrant selectivity in the context 
of typical north-to-north migration, where similar productivity levels between the source 
and the destination imply that low-skill wages are also similar, such that  1
s
1
h W W ≈ .  In 
that case, both models predict that emigrants who move from a source with high returns 
to skill to a destination with low returns should be negatively selected.  However, the 
models make different predictions in the context of much south-to-north migration, where   11
differences in productivity imply that 
11
hs WW >> .  Here, our linear utility model predicts 
negative selection only when the relative return to skill in the source country ( 3
h
3
s /δ δ ) 
exceeds the relative productivity advantage of the destination country ( 1
s
1
h W / W) .
10   
  The evidence suggests that returns to schooling tend to be higher in developing 
countries than in the U.S. or Europe (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Hanushek and 
Zhang, 2006), so the log utility/proportional cost model implies that emigrants from 
developing countries should tend to be negatively selected.  This prediction is clearly at 
odds with Figure 1.  However, the linear utility model could be consistent with Figure 1, 
so along as productivity differences across countries dominate differences in the returns 
to schooling (or skill-specific migration costs are higher for low-skill workers). 
  While many studies have tested for the selectivity of migrants, fewer analysts 
have examined migrant sorting across multiple destinations.  Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 
(1992) develop a theoretical model that predicts sorting on the basis of destination returns 
to skill.  They and Dahl (2002) estimate empirical models of sorting using data on 
internal migration in the U.S.  There have been no studies of migrant sorting in the 
context of international labor flows. 
  One point that seems to have escaped the theoretical literature is that selection and 
sorting are logically independent.  In terms of our model, sorting between destinations h 
and k depends on the sign of  
h k 3131 3131
h h sh sh k k sk sk [W W (g g )] [W W (g g )] Δ = −− − − −− − ,  
                                                 
10 Factoring in skill-specific migration costs makes predictions about selection even more ambiguous in the 
linear utility/fixed cost model.  Recall that skill specific costs in (11), g
3
sh, may be positive or negative.  If 
more skilled workers tend to have higher (lower) costs, the likelihood of negative selection would be higher 
(lower) than the base case of no skill-specific costs.   12
whereas from (5), selection to destination h depends on the sign of  
h3 3 3 1 1 1
h s sh h s sh (W W g ) (W W g ) Δ= − − − − − .   
Since selection depends on source-country wages, whereas sorting does not, sorting is 
independent of selection.  If  0 hk > Δ , then destination h should receive more highly 
skilled migrants than destination k.  This should hold whether emigrants from s to both h 
and k are positively selected ( 0 , 0 k h > Δ > Δ ), negatively selected ( 0 , 0 k h < Δ < Δ ), or 
even bimodally selected ( 0 h < Δ  and  0 k > Δ  or vice-versa).   
 
C. Estimation 
  Although the discussion until now has been cast in terms of population 
magnitudes, it is straightforward to derive an estimating equation which can be used to 
test for income maximization.  Let xsh be a vector of characteristics of the source-
destination pair, such as geographic and linguistic distance, and let skill-varying costs be 
given by  j
sh
j
sh x g θ = .
11  The empirical version of the scale equation is  
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where  3 3 αθ − = β ; I(A) is the indicator function such that I(A)=1 if A is true and I(A)=0 
otherwise; hat notation denotes statistical averages;  j







sh −  is 
an error term reflecting sampling error; and we have assumed that  β = α − sh sh x f.   T h e  
empirical selection and sorting equations are given by  
                                                 
11  The analysis is partial equilibrium in nature and cannot be used to examine how bilateral migration 
flows affect the wage structure in destination countries.    13
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sh sh − = η . 
  The key hypothesis to be tested in each regression is that α > 0, as utility 
maximization requires.  Indeed, if the models are properly specified, all three equations 
should yield similar estimates of α.  However, an important difference among these 
specifications is the treatment of fixed costs.  To estimate the scale equation (12) we must 
assume fixed costs are a function of observable characteristics.  If that assumption fails, 
the scale equation may be misspecified.  In contrast, fixed costs are differenced out of the 
selection and scale equations, so they should provide a more robust basis for inference.   
  The scale and selection equations require data on both source and destination 
wages.  This limits the sample, since reliable wage data are not available for all potential 
source countries.  The sorting equation requires only destination-country wage data, 
increasing the number of source countries that can be used to estimate the model.  
Additionally, measurement error may be lower in the destination countries, comprised of 
OECD members, than in source countries, which include the developing world. 
  Finally, we estimate the log-utility model so as to provide a direct comparison 
with the linear-utility model.  In the important special case where fixed costs are zero and 
skill-varying costs are proportional to wages, such that 
jj j
sh sh sh h mg / W λ =− λ =− λ π , the 
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=λ δ +ρ +η ,  
where we have assumed that  sh sh x −λπ = θ.  As above, a test for income maximization 
amounts to a test for λ > 0, and if the models are properly specified, all three equations 
should yield similar estimates of λ. 
 
3.  Data and Empirical Setting 
In the introduction we presented data on skill-specific migration rates which 
showed evidence of positive selection.  They also showed evidence of sorting across 
multiple destinations of the type predicted by income maximization.  Those data are from 
Docquier and Marfouk (2006).  We base our regression analysis on an updated version of 
these data from Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport (2007; hereafter, BDR). 
BDR tabulate data on stocks of emigrants by source and destination country.  In 
collaboration with the national statistical offices of 20 OECD countries, they estimate the 
population in each OECD country of immigrants 25 years and older by source country 
and education level.  In some of the OECD destinations, these counts are based on census 
data, whereas in others they are based on register data.  BDR classify schooling levels 
into three categories: primary (0-8 years), secondary (9-12 years), and tertiary (13 plus 
years).  Because education systems differ so much among countries, it is nearly 
impossible to categorize schooling in a comparable manner at a finer level of detail.   15
 
A. Measurement of Emigrant Stocks 
Aggregating data from multiple destination countries raises several comparability 
issues.  The first involves the definition of immigrants.  Some countries, such as 
Germany, define immigrants on the basis of country of citizenship rather than country of 
birth.  This causes some of the foreign born to be excluded from BDR’s immigrant counts 
in these countries.  We check the robustness of our regression results by dropping such 
countries from some of the specifications.  
Measuring education levels poses several problems.  In Belgium and Italy, the 
statistical office reports aggregate immigrant counts but does not disaggregate by 
education level.  BDR impute the skill distribution of immigrants in such cases using data 
from household labor-force surveys, but in light of the role that education plays in our 
analysis, we drop Belgium and Italy from the sample of destinations.  
National statistical offices differ in how they classify educational attainment.  
Some countries' classification systems have no attainment category that distinguishes 
whether a person who lacks a secondary-school qualification (such as a high school 
diploma) acquired any secondary education, or whether their schooling stopped at the 
primary level (grade 8 or below).  This could result in inconsistencies in the share of 
primary-educated immigrants across destination countries.  In our regressions we control 
for whether the destination country explicitly codes primary education. 
Some immigrants may have acquired their tertiary schooling in the destination 
country. By implication, they might have obtained less schooling had they not migrated.  
BDR provide some evidence on this point in the form of immigrant counts (for those with 
tertiary education) that vary by the age at which migrants arrived in the destination   16
country (any age, 12 years or older, 18 years or older, 22 years or older).  They find that 
68% of tertiary migrants arrive in the destination country at age 22 or older, and 10% 
arrive between ages 18 and 21, suggesting the large majority of tertiary emigrants depart 
sending countries at an age at which they would typically have acquired at least some 
post-secondary education.  Reassuringly, the correlations in emigration rates by age at 
migration range from 0.97 to 0.99.  In section 4.2 we provide additional checks on the 
importance of tertiary schooling acquired in the destination country. 
Finally, although our theoretical framework treats migration as a permanent 
decision, many migrants do not remain abroad forever.  There is considerable back-and-
forth migration between neighboring countries (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno, 2001), 
which we address by controlling for source-destination proximity.  Furthermore, some 
migrants are students who will return to their home countries after completing their 
education.  These migrants may have been motivated by educational opportunities in 
destination countries, as well as wage differences (Rosenzweig, 2006).  BDR partially 
address this issue by restricting the foreign born to be 25 years and older, a population 
that should have largely completed its schooling.  In 2000 in the United States, the share 
of foreign-born individuals 25-64 years old with tertiary education who stated they were 
not in school was 86.4%.  In section 4.2 we attempt to control for differences in 
educational opportunities between source and destination countries. 
  Tables 1 and 2 describe broad patterns of migration into OECD countries.  As 
noted in section 1, Table 1 shows that North America receives disproportionately high-
skilled migrants, whereas Europe's' immigrants are disproportionately low-skilled.  Table 
2 shows the share of OECD immigrants by country of origin for the 15 largest source   17
countries.  Source countries tend to send emigrants to nearby destinations, as is evident in 
Turkish migration to Europe, Korean migration to Australia and Oceania, and Mexican 
and Cuban migration to the United States.  Yet, most of the source countries in Table 2 
send migrants to all three destination regions.  Finally, Figure 2 plots the log odds of 
emigration for the tertiary educated against the log odds of emigration for the primary 
educated.  Nearly all points lie above the 45-degree line, indicating that the log odds of 
emigration is higher for the more educated, as is consistent with emigrants being 
positively selected in terms of schooling.   
 
B. Wage Measures 
  The key explanatory variables in our regression models are functions of skill-
group-specific wages in the source and destination countries.  Ideally, we would estimate 
wages by broad education category from the same sources used by DM.  Since such data 
are not available to us, we turn to different sources. 
  Our first source is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, various years), which 
collects microdata from the household surveys of 30 primarily developed countries 
worldwide.  This includes most of the destination countries in the BDR data, with the 
exceptions of Finland, Greece, New Zealand, and Portugal.  The intersection of the 13 
countries for which BDR and LIS provide useful data (Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK, 
the US) were host to 91 percent of immigrants in the OECD in 2000.
12  We use data from 
waves 4 and 5 of the LIS, which span the years 1994-2000. 
                                                 
12 We exclude Switzerland from the destinations because the LIS provides no data on the country after 
1992.  In 2000, Switzerland had 2.5 percent of the foreign-born population residing in OECD countries.    18
  Although the LIS attempts to “harmonize” the data from different countries, a 
number of comparability issues arise.  One limitation is that the LIS’s constituent 
household surveys sometimes classify educational attainment differently than the national 
statistical office of the corresponding country.  This adds the problem of within-country 
comparability to the already difficult problem of between-country comparability.  
Ultimately, it proved impossible for us to map education categories between the BDR and 
the LIS data in a manner in which we had full confidence. 
  Therefore, instead of using education-specific earnings to measure skill-related 
wages, we use quantiles of each country’s earnings distribution.  We use the 20th 
percentile as our measure of low-skill wages and the 80th percentile as our measure of 
high-skill wages.
13  We average across 1994 to 2000 for each country in the LIS.
14, 
  Although the cross-country comparability of the LIS is a desirable feature, we can 
only use the LIS to estimate our sorting regressions.  The reason is that it provides wage 
data only for our destination countries, whereas the scale and sorting regressions require 
comparable wage data for the source countries as well.  To the best of our knowledge, 
there is no study that provides micro-level data for a large sample of source countries.
15  
We rely on two sources of aggregate data to construct the source-destination wage 
difference measures needed to estimate the scale and sorting regressions. 
                                                 
13  In a previous version of this paper (Grogger and Hanson, 2007), we experimented with alternative 
measures of wage differences based on various measures of low-skill wages and different measures of the 
return to skill (the standard deviation of income, the ratio of income in the 80
th to 20
th percentiles, and the 
Gini coefficient).  All alternatives we considered generated results similar to those we report in this paper. 
14 The years corresponding to each country are as follows:  Australia (1995, 2001), Austria (1994, 1995, 
1997, 2000), Canada (1994, 1997, 1998, 2000), Denmark (1995, 2000), France (1994, 2000), Germany 
(1004, 2000), the Netherlands (1994, 1999), Norway (1995, 2000), Spain (1995, 2000), Sweden (1995, 
2000), the UK (1994, 1995, 2000), and the US (1994, 1997, 2000). 
15  The IPUMS-International study provides samples of Census data for 26 countries, but many important 
sources and destinations for migrants are not included.   19
  One source combines Gini coefficients from the WIDER World Income 
Inequality Database with per capita GDP from the World Development Indicators 
(hereafter, WDI).  Under the assumption that income has a log normal distribution, Gini 
coefficients can be used to estimate the variance of log income.
16  Using per capita GDP 
to measure mean wages, we can then construct estimates of the 20th and 80th percentiles 
of wages (see note 17), which we are able to do for 102 source countries and 15 
destination countries.
17 
  A second source uses data from Freeman and Oostendorp (2000; hereafter FO), 
who have collected information on earnings by occupation and industry from the 
International Labor Organization’s October Inquiry Survey.  FO standardize the ILO data 
to correct for differences in how countries report earnings.  The resulting data contain 
observations on earnings in up to 163 occupation-industries per country in each year, 
from which FO construct deciles for earnings by country and year.  For each country, we 
take as low-skill wages earnings corresponding to the 10
th percentile and as high-skill 
wages earnings corresponding to the 80
th percentile.  We choose these deciles because 
they give the highest correlations with 80
th and 20
th percentile wages in the LIS.  Since 
not all countries report data in all years, for each country we take the mean across the 
period 1988 to 1997, creating a sample with 101 source countries and 12 destinations. 
                                                 
16 Suppose log income is normally distributed with mean μ and variance σ.  Given an estimate of the Gini 
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.  Note further that the 
value of log income at the α quantile is given by 
2 exp( z /2) α μσ − σ , where  α z  is the α quantile of N(0,1). 
17  We restricted attention to Gini coefficients computed from income data over the period 1990-2000, 
where the underlying sample was drawn from the country’s full population.  For each country, we averaged 
over all Gini coefficients that satisfied those criteria.  GDP per capita is averaged over the period 1990 to 
2000 and expressed in constant 2000 dollars.   20
  Table 3 presents summary statistics of these wage measures.  The top two panels 
provide data for the destination countries.  The top panel shows that the LIS produces 
higher wages and larger skill-related wage differences than the other sources.  Despite the 
differences in scale, the correlation between skill-related wage differences in the LIS and 
the WDI data is 0.86; between the LIS and the FO data it is 0.78. 
  The second panel reports summary statistics for after-tax measures of destination-
country wages.  We consider such measures since pre-tax wage differences overstate the 
return to skill enjoyed by workers and since tax policy varies within the OECD (Alesina 
and Angeletos 2002).  To construct post-tax wage differences we employ average tax 
rates by income level published by the OECD since 1996 (OECD, various years).  To 
20th percentile earnings we apply the tax rate applicable to single workers with no 
dependents whose earnings equal 67 percent of the average production worker’s earnings.  
To 80th percentile earnings we apply the tax rate applicable to a comparable worker with 
earnings equal to 167 percent of the average production worker’s earnings.
18  In both 
cases, the tax rate includes income taxes net of benefits plus both sides of the payroll tax.  
After-tax wage differences are only about half as large as pre-tax differences.   
  The third panel provides data for the source countries.  Only WDI and FO data are 
shown, since the LIS provides no source-country data.  Source country wages vary less 
than destination-country wages between the two sources; the correlation between skill-
related wage differences is 0.91.  Unfortunately, we have no tax data for most of our 
source countries.  Thus the scale and selection regressions below are estimated only from 
pre-tax wage data, whereas we report sorting regressions for pre- and post-tax wages. 
                                                 
18  Prior to averaging income across years, we match to each year and income group that year’s 
corresponding tax rate. Since the tax data only go back to 1996, we use tax rates for that year to calculate 
post-tax income values in 1994 and 1995.   21
 
D. Other Variables in the Regression Model 
  Differences in language between source and destination countries may be 
relatively more important for more-educated workers, since communication and 
information processing are likely to be salient aspects of their occupations.  We control 
for whether the source and destination country share a common official language based 
on data from CEPII (http://www.cepii.fr/).  Similarly, English-speaking countries may 
attract skilled emigrants because English is widely taught in school as a second 
language.
19  To avoid confounding destination-country skilled-unskilled wage differences 
with the attraction of being in an English-speaking country, we control for whether a 
destination country has English as its primary language.   
  Migration costs are likely to be increasing in distance between a source and 
destination country. Relatedly, proximity may make illegal immigration less costly, 
thereby increasing the relative migration of less-educated individuals.  We include as 
regressors great circle distance, the absolute difference in longitude, and an indicator for 
source-destination contiguity.  Migration networks may lower migration costs (Munshi, 
2003), benefiting lower-income individuals disproportionately (Orrenius and Zavodny, 
2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006).  Networks may be stronger between countries that 
share a common colonial heritage, for which we control using CEPII’s indicators of 
whether a pair of countries have short or long colonial histories.  We also control for 
                                                 
19  English-speaking countries may also attract the more skilled because they have common-law traditions 
that provide relatively strong protection of property rights (Glaeser and Schleifer, 2002).     22
migrant networks using lagged migration, measured as the total stock of emigrants from a 
source country in a destination as of 1990.
20 
  Destination countries impose a variety of conditions in deciding which 
immigrants to admit, many of which involve the education level of immigrants.  One 
indicator of the skill bias in a country’s admission policies is the fraction of visas it 
reserves for refugees and asylees.   Less-educated individuals may be more likely to end 
up as refugees, making countries that favor refugees in their admissions likely to receive 
more less-educated immigrants.  We control for the share of immigrant inflows 
composed of refugees and asylees averaged over the 1992-1999 period (OECD, 2005).
21  
The European signatories of the Schengen Agreement have committed to abolish all 
border barriers, including temporary migration restrictions, on participating countries.  
We control for whether a source-destination pair were both signatories of Schengen as of 
1999.  Similarly, some countries do not require visas for visitors from particular countries 
of origin, with the set of visa-waiver countries varying across destination countries.  
While visa waivers strictly affect only tourist and business travelers, they may indicate a 
source-country bias that also applies to other immigrant admissions.  We control for 
whether a destination country grants a visa waiver to individuals from a source country as 
of 1999.  Clearly, other aspects of policy may influence migration as well.  
Unfortunately, the existing data do not permit one to characterize immigration policy 
very thoroughly in a manner that is comparable across destinations.  As important as 
                                                 
20 Because we are missing lagged migration for many observations in the sample, we add the variable only 
in later specifications.  All results are robust to its inclusion. 
21 Countries also differ in the share of visas that they reserve for skilled labor.  Unfortunately, we could 
only obtain this measure for a subset of destination countries.  Over time, the share of visas awarded to 
asylees/refugees and the share awarded to skill workers are strongly negative correlated (OECD, 2005), 
suggesting policies on asylees/refugees may be a sufficient statistic for a country’s immigration priorities.   23
immigration policy may be, existing data simply do not permit a more detailed 
characterization of the policy environment. 
  Finally, note that the regressors used in the analysis vary either by destination or 
source-destination pair.  One might imagine that source-country-specific characteristics 
could also affect international migration.  Some, such as the state of the credit market or 
the poverty rate, are observable and could be controlled for explicitly.  Others, however, 
are unobservable.  Rather than controlling for a limited set of observable source-country 
characteristics explicitly, we provide implicit controls for both observable and 




4. Regression Analysis 
A. Main results 
  Our main regression analyses are based on the scale, selection, and sorting 
regressions derived from the linear-utility model, equations (12), (13), and (14), 
respectively.  Our main results are based on wage measures constructed from the WDI 
and LIS data.  Estimates are reported in Table 4. 
  In the scale equation reported in column (1), the unit of observation is the source-
destination-skill group cell, with one observation for the primary educated (j=1) and one 
observation for the tertiary educated (j=3) for each source-destination pair.  The 
                                                 
22 In unreported results, we experimented with two source-specific variables.  Private credit to the private 
sector as a share of GDP is a measure of the financial development of the source country (Aghion et al. 
2006), which may affect constraints on financing migration.  The variable was statistically insignificant in 
all specifications and its inclusion did not affect other results.  The incidence of poverty in the source 
country may also affect credit constraints.  While data on poverty headcounts are not available for all the 
countries in our sample, the share of agriculture in GDP tends to be highly correlated with poverty 
measures.  The inclusion of the agriculture share of GDP also leaves our core results unchanged.      24
dependent variable is the log odds of emigrating from source s to destination h for 
members of skill group j, and the wage measure is the skill-specific difference in pre-tax 
wages between the destination and source countries,  j
s
j
h W W − .  In the selection equation 
reported in column (2), the unit of observation is the source-destination pair.
23  The 
dependent variable is the difference between the log skill ratio of emigrants from s to h 
and the log skill ratio of non-migrants in source s.
24  The wage measure is the difference 
between the destination and the source in skill-related pre-tax wage differences, 







h − − − .  In the sorting equations reported in columns (3) through (6), 
the unit of observation is again the source-destination pair, but the dependent variable is 
the log skill ratio of emigrants from s to h.  The key independent variable is the skill-
related wage difference of the destination country,  ) W W ( 1
h
3
h − .  Like the scale and 
selection regressions, the sorting regressions in columns (3) and (4) are based on the WDI 
data; column (3) is based on pre-tax data, whereas column (4) is based on post-tax data.  
Columns (5) and (6) are based on pre- and post-tax data from the LIS. 
    Because the dependent variables have a log-odds metric, the magnitude of the 
regression coefficients does not have a particularly useful interpretation.
25  As a result, 
we focus in this section on the signs and significance levels of the coefficients.  We 
discuss applications below that provide information about the quantitative effects of key 
variables on migration scale, selectivity, and sorting.   
                                                 
23 In the WDI data, there are 15 destinations and 102 source countries.   Since source countries do not send 
emigrants to every destination country, the number of observations is less than 15 x 102 = 1530. 
24 Equivalently, the dependent variable can be seen as the difference in the log odds of migrating from 
source s to destination h between the tertiary educated and the primary educated. 
25 Based on equation (4), one might think that the coefficient on the earnings difference would identify the 
marginal utility of income.  However, this would only be true if the variance on the idiosyncratic 
component of utility in (3) is unity.   25
  In addition to the variables shown, all of the regressions include a dummy 
variable equal to one if the destination-country statistical office explicitly codes a primary 
education category.  This controls for systematic differences in our dependent variable 
that arise from different coding schemes, as discussed in section 3.  The scale regression 
includes a dummy variable equal to one for observations corresponding to the tertiary-
educated skill group, denoted I(j=3), and interactions between that dummy and all other 
regressors (these coefficients are not shown in order to save space).  The sorting 
regressions include a full set of source-country dummies.  Standard errors, reported in 
parentheses, are clustered by destination country. 
  The wage coefficients in columns (1) through (3) are directly comparable because 
they are all based on pre-tax data from WDI.  In the context of our model, they each 
provide estimates of the same parameter α, where income maximization implies α > 0.  
Furthermore, if the regression models are properly specified, the coefficients from scale, 
selection, and sorting regressions should be similar.   
  In Table 4, all three wage coefficients are positive, as predicted by the theory.  
Furthermore, the coefficients from the selection and sorting regressions are quite similar 
and are both statistically significant.  However, the coefficient in the scale equation is 
smaller and insignificant.  This may indicate that omitted fixed costs result in a 
misspecified scale equation.  In the scale equation, we assume that fixed costs are a 
function of observable characteristics of the source-destination pair.  In the selection and 
sorting regressions, in contrast, fixed costs are differenced out.  The difference in the 
wage coefficients between the scale and selection regressions suggests that the scale   26
equation omits fixed costs that are negatively correlated with the difference in skill-
specific wage differences between destination and source countries. 
  The wage coefficient in column (4) suggests that migrants sort more strongly on 
post-tax wages than pre-tax wages, as one might expect.  The estimates in columns (5) 
and (6), based on wage data from the LIS, show a similar pattern.  Both coefficients are 
positive and significant, and the coefficient on post-tax wages in column (6) is larger than 
the coefficient on pre-tax wages in column (5).  Among the destination countries in the 
sample, the U.S and Canada have relatively large pre-tax skill-related wage differences.  
Since these countries also have less progressive tax systems, their relative attractiveness 
to skilled migrants is enhanced by accounting for taxes.
26 
  The regressions also include variables reflecting geographic, linguistic, social, and 
political relationships between source and destination countries.  They show that 
language plays an important role in international migration.  The positive coefficient on 
the Anglophone-destination dummy in column (1) shows that English-speaking countries 
receive more immigrants than other countries, all else equal.  The coefficient in the 
selection regression (column (2)) shows that emigrants bound for English-speaking 
destinations are more highly educated in relation to their non-migrant countrymen than 
emigrants bound elsewhere.  Finally, the coefficients in the sorting regressions (columns 
(3) through (6)) show that English-speaking destinations attract higher-skilled immigrants 
than other destinations, on average.   
  The next variable is also language-related, indicating whether the source and 
destination countries have an official language in common.  Its coefficients are positive 
                                                 
26 In the LIS data, the U.S., the U.K, and Canada are first, fourth and fifth among destinations in terms of 
pre-tax wage differences and first, second, and third in terms of post-tax wage differences.   27
and significant, like the Anglophone-destination coefficients.  Emigration is greater 
toward destinations that share a language with the source, and such emigrants are more 
skilled than either their non-migrant counterparts or emigrants from the same source 
bound to other destinations.  This suggests that migrants perceive higher rewards to skill 
in destinations where they can speak a language they know. 
  The next three variables capture differences in geography between the source and 
destination countries.  Contiguity raises the scale of migration.  However, it reduces the 
skills of emigrants, all else equal, in relation both to non-migrants (as seen in the 
selection regression) and to migrants to non-contiguous destinations (as seen in the 
sorting regression), perhaps reflecting the relative ease of illegal migration between 
neighboring countries.  In the scale equation, the longitude-difference coefficient is 
insignificant, but the log-distance coefficient is negative and significant.  One 
interpretation is that migration is lower, the greater the distance between the source and 
the destination, but controlling for distance, the need to cross an ocean (which follows 
from long longitudinal distances) has no independent effect.  The same two coefficients 
have different signs in the selection and sorting regressions.  Emigrants to more distant 
destinations are more skilled than non-migrants, all else equal, but less skilled than 
emigrants to other destinations.  The opposite is true of transoceanic emigrants. 
  History affects migration, too.  Both short- and long-term colonial relationships 
increase the scale of migration, all else equal.  At the same time, emigrants to the former 
colonial power are less skilled than non-migrants and less skilled than emigrants to other 
destinations.  Recent literature suggests that economic and social networks between 
industrialized countries and their former colonies contribute to bilateral migration flows,   28
much in the way such networks also appear to contribute to bilateral trade (Pedersen, 
Pytlikova, and Smith  2004, Mayda 2005).  Our empirical results are consistent with 
these linkages disproportionately affecting migration of the less-skilled. 
  There is also an important role for our limited measures of immigration policy.  
The effect of asylum policy on the scale of immigration is insignificant, but generous 
asylum policies reduce immigrant skills with relation to both non-migrants and migrants 
to other destinations.  This finding suggests destinations that allocate a higher share of 
visas to asylees and refugees may limit opportunities for more-skilled migrants to gain 
entry, producing a less skilled migrant inflow.
27  Visa waivers are associated with higher 
migration rates, although the effect is marginally significant.  Visa waivers significantly 
reduce the skills of emigrants in relation to non-migrants, but increase skill in relation to 
emigrants who move to a destination with which the source country has no visa waiver.  
The Schengen accord has had little effect on the scale of migration among signatory 
countries, but it is associated with positive selection and positive sorting of migrants.   
 
B. Results for Log Utility Model 
  Table 5 reports results based on the scale, selection, and sorting regressions 
derived from the log-utility model in equations (15), (16), and (17).  The layout of Table 
5 is similar to Table 4.  The dependent variables in Table 5 are the same as those in the 
corresponding columns of Table 4 and the units of observation are the same as well.   
  The wage measures differ between the linear and log-utility models.  In the scale 
equation of the log-utility model, reported in column (1), the wage measure is the skill-
specific difference in pre-tax log wages between the destination and source countries, 
                                                 




h W ln W ln − .  In the selection equation reported in column (2), the measure is the 
difference between the destination and the source in the return to skill,  ) ( 1
s
3
h δ − δ , where 
the return to skill in a country is the log ratio of high-skill to low-skill wages.  In the 
sorting equations reported in columns (3) through (6), the wage variable is the return to 
skill in the destination country,  3
h δ .  As in Table 4, columns (1) through (4) are based on 
the WDI data, whereas columns (5) and (6) are based on LIS data .  Returns to skill are 
based on pre-tax data in columns (1), (2), (3), and (5) and on post-tax data in columns (4) 
and (6).  To focus on a case of special importance in the literature, we impose the 
assumptions that fixed migration costs are zero and skill-varying costs are proportionate 
to wages.  This implies that in the scale regression, the regressors control for proportional 
migration costs (see equation (15) and the surrounding discussion).  It also means that the 
only regressor in the selection regression is  ) ( 1
s
3
h δ − δ , since proportional costs are 
differenced out.  Likewise it implies that the only regressors in the sorting regressions are 
3
h δ  and the source-country dummies. 
  As in the linear-utility model, utility maximization implies that all of the 
coefficients on log wages and returns to skill should be positive.  Furthermore, if the 
model is properly specified, the coefficients in columns (1) through (3) should be similar.  
In fact, the wage coefficients in the scale and selection regressions are negative and 
significant, whereas the sorting coefficients are both positive and significant.   30
  The assumptions that fixed costs are zero and skill-varying costs are proportional 
to wages result in rather sparsely parameterized regressions.
28  When we relax these 
restrictions by assuming both fixed and skill-varying costs to be functions of observed 
country-pair characteristics, the wage coefficients in the scale and selection regressions 
remain negative and significant and the wage coefficients in the sorting regressions 
remain positive and significant.
29  Thus, the sign pattern of the coefficients in Table 5 
holds whether or not other regressors are included in the estimation. 
  We see two potential explanations for the difference between the linear-utility and 
log-utility regressions.  One concerns omitted variable bias due to weak controls for fixed 
costs.  Differencing the scale equation between skill groups eliminates fixed costs from 
the selection and sorting regressions in the case of linear utility, but not in the case of log 
utility.  Fixed costs that were strongly negatively correlated with source-destination 
differences in log wages and returns to skill could explain the negative coefficients in the 
scale and selection regressions in Table 5. 
  Perhaps more important is the lack of negative selectivity in the data, as seen in 
Figure 1.  Log-utility maximization requires that λ be positive.  It also requires that for 
source-destination pairs where  3
s
3
h δ − δ  < 0, migrants be negatively selected.  In the data, 
we observe numerous cases where  3
s
3
h δ − δ  < 0, but no negative selection.  Inspection of 
                                                 
28 Belot and Hatton (2008) find that the correlation between skilled migration rates and the skill-specific 
difference in log wages between source and destination countries is sensitive to whether controls for 
poverty rates in the source are included in the estimation.  In unreported results, we find that the negative 
coefficient on the returns to skill we estimate in the log utility selection regression obtains whether or not 
controls for poverty rates are included in the estimation (see note 22).  
29 In the log utility model, if we assume that fixed migration costs are a function of the same variables as in 
Table 4, allowing for fixed costs means including these variables as regressors, divided by the destination 
country wage, as shown in the derivations of equations (8)-(10).  Alternatively, one might imagine 
including these regressors uninteracted with the destination wage.  Under either specification – including 
the same regressors as in Table 4 either on their own or divided by the destination wage – the log wage 
variable enters with a negative sign in the scale and selection regressions.     31
equation (9) shows that such negative correlation between  3
s
3
h δ − δ  and 







sh −  will tend to result in a negative estimate of λ, contrary to the 
requirements of the theory.  In other words, the lack of negative selection in the data is at 
odds with the joint assumptions that migrants maximize the log utility of net wages and 
that migration costs are proportional to wages. 
  A remaining question is why the wage coefficients in the log-utility sorting 
regressions are positive, like their counterparts in the linear-utility sorting regressions.  
Put differently, why do the sorting regressions fail to distinguish between linear and log 
utility, when the selection regressions draw the distinction so clearly?  The reason is that 
the wage measure only varies among the 15 destination countries, and among countries 
with relatively similar levels of labor productivity, sorting on log differences in wages 
(i.e., returns to skill) looks similar to sorting on level differences in wages.  Indeed, the 
rank correlation between the log wage difference and the level wage difference across 
destination countries is 0.68.  In order to distinguish between linear and log utility on the 
basis of the sorting regressions, one would need a sample that included destinations with 
widely differing levels of productivity.
30   
 
C. Robustness Checks 
  Tables 6 through 8 report results from a number of specifications designed to 
check the robustness of our results.  We restrict attention to the linear utility model in 
light of its superior performance relative to the log utility model.  We further restrict 
attention to the selection and sorting regressions, since they are more robust in the 
                                                 
30  The similarity of productivity levels among U.S. states may explain why log-utility models have yielded 
evidence in favor of sorting among U.S. domestic migrants (Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo 1994; Dahl 2002).   32
presence of fixed migration costs.  For the sorting regressions, we focus on specifications 
that include the post-tax wage differences.  All of the estimates reported in these tables 
are taken from regressions that include all the variables reported in our baseline 
specifications, shown in columns (2), (4) and (6) of Table 4.  Here we present only the 
wage coefficients in order to conserve space. 
  Table 6 presents estimates based on alternative wage measures.  The top panel 
reports results based on WDI wages in which source wages are adjusted by source-
country PPP and destination wages are adjusted by destination PPP, to account for 
differences in the cost of living across countries.  Adjusting for PPP makes the coefficient 
in the selection regression slightly larger and the coefficient in the sorting regression 
slightly smaller and insignificant.  In the second panel, we see that adjusting for PPP 
using LIS wages yields wage coefficients that are positive and significant, as in Table 4.
31  
  The bottom two panels of Table 6 present results based on the Freeman-
Oostendorp wage data described in Section 3.  Without adjusting for PPP, the wage 
coefficients in both the selection and sorting regressions are positive.  The selection 
coefficient is significant, whereas the sorting coefficient has a t-statistic of 1.6.  Adjusting 
the Freeman-Oostendorp wages for PPP reduces the selection coefficient and raises both 
the sorting coefficient and its significance.  We conclude that the key results from the 
linear utility model are fairly robust to alternative wage measures.
32 
                                                 
31  The sample size is smaller here than for other LIS-based regressions because of missing PPP data for a 
few source countries. 
32  It would seem natural to treat the FO data as an instrument for the WDI data to deal with measurement 
error.  To be a valid instrument, the measurement errors associated with the two different data sources 
would have to be uncorrelated with each other and with the true wage measures.  Preliminary analysis 
showed that the covariance between the two measures exceeded the variance of the FO wage measure, 
which implies that the measurement errors are correlated with each other, with true wages, or both.   33
  In Table 7 we return to our original unadjusted, WDI and LIS-based wage 
measures and report results obtained from alternative specifications.  Columns (1) 
through (3) address the problem that some emigrants may have obtained their tertiary 
education in the destination country rather than the source country.  If the cost of 
acquiring tertiary education across destination countries were negatively correlated with 
destination-country wage differences, then the effect on immigrant skill that we attribute 
to wage differences could instead be due to differences in educational costs.  To deal with 
this issue we redefine the numerator of the skill ratios in the dependent variables to be the 
sum of tertiary- and secondary-educated immigrants.  This addresses the problem if we 
can assume all tertiary-educated immigrants would have obtained at least a secondary 
education in their source country.  The coefficients in columns (1) through (3), where the 
dependent variables are based on this alternative definition of the log skill ratio, are all 
positive and significant and differ little from estimates in our baseline specifications. 
  Columns (4) through (9) report the results of adding to our baseline specifications 
two variables designed to capture other potential costs or benefits of migration that vary 
by skill.  Columns (4)-(6) add a relative university quality measure based on the world-
wide ranking of universities by Shanghai Jiao Tong University (http://ed.sjtu.edu.cn).  It 
is equal to the average rank of universities within the destination country (among top 250 
universities worldwide), interacted with a dummy variable equal to one if the source 
country has no ranked universities.
33  We intend this as a proxy for the education-related 
benefit of migrating relative to remaining in the home country.  Relative university 
quality has no effect on emigrant selectivity, as seen in column (4).  The coefficients in 
                                                 
33  Observations in which Ireland is the destination are dropped from these regressions because Ireland has 
no universities in the top 250.   34
the sorting regressions (columns (5) and (6)) are negative, as one might expect (higher-
ranked institutions have ranks closer to one), and significant.  Higher ranked universities 
appear to act as a draw for higher-skilled immigrants from countries with low-quality 
education systems, consistent with Rosenzweig (2006).  The wage coefficients in all three 
regressions are similar to those from our baseline specifications. 
  Columns (7) through (9) add the log total stock of emigrants from the source in 
the destination as of 1990.  We are missing this variable for about 30% of our sample, 
which causes the number of observations to drop considerably.  Nevertheless, the wage 
variables have similar magnitudes and patterns of significance as in Table 4.  In the 
selection regression, the lagged migrant stock enters with a negative sign and is precisely 
estimated.  Larger past bilateral migration is associated with less-educated current 
migration, consistent with migrant networks lowering migration costs disproportionately 
for less-skilled individuals.  Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) and McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2006) obtain similar findings for Mexican migration to the U.S.   In the sorting 
regressions, lagged migration also enters negatively, indicating that the pull of an existing 
migrant stock in a destination is stronger for less-skilled migrants, but the coefficient is 
precisely estimated only in one of the two regressions. 
  In columns (10) and (11), we present sorting regressions based on data from all 
the available source countries, irrespective of whether we have wage data for them.  This 
highlights the advantage of the sorting regression, for which only destination-country 
wage data is necessary.  Estimates based on the larger sample are similar to those from 
the smaller sample that includes only source countries with available wage data.   35
  Table 8 addresses the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
implicit in the conditional logit framework.  IIA arises from the assumption that the error 
terms in equation (3) are i.i.d. across alternative destinations.  IIA may be violated if two 
or more of our destinations are perceived as close substitutes by potential migrants.  
Hausman and McFadden (1984) note that if IIA is satisfied, then the estimated regression 
coefficients should be stable across choice sets.  In the context of our application, this 
means that the regression coefficients should be similar when we drop destinations from 
the sample.  To check for violations of IIA, we re-estimated our models 15 times, each 
time dropping one of the 15 destinations.  The resulting coefficients on the key wage 
variables are reported in Table 8.  In general, they are quite similar across samples, 
suggesting that the IIA property is not violated in our data.
34 
 
D.  Fixed Costs, Emigrant Selectivity, and the Sorting of Migrants by Skill Level 
  In this section we use the estimates from our regression analysis to shed light on 
different dimensions of international migration.  These analyses provide insights into the 
scale, selectivity, and sorting of migrants.  The first issue we address concerns fixed 
costs, which according to theory should play a role in determining the scale of migration.  
Despite the importance of fixed costs, there is little information on the magnitude of these 
costs in the literature.  Our framework allows us to estimate fixed migration costs that are 
specific to each source-destination pair.   
  The estimates stem from the scale equation (4).  If we include a dummy variable 
for each source-destination pair in our sample, assuming as before that skill-varying costs 
                                                 
34  We attempted to compute asymptotic chi-square statistics along the lines of Hausman and McFadden 
(1984) to test for stability across choice sets in all the regression coefficients.  For the most part, the 
asymptotic covariance matrices were singular, a finite-sample problem that often arises in Hausman tests.   36
are given by  j
sh
j
sh x g θ = , we obtain numerically identical estimates to those obtained by 
estimating the selection equation (13).  However, as a by-product, we obtain estimates of 
-αfsh from the coefficients on the source-destination dummy variables.  To recover an 
estimate of fixed costs fsh, we divide those coefficients by our estimate of -α, where α is 
the coefficient on wages.  This provides estimates of fixed migration costs relative to an 
omitted source-destination base pair, in thousands of 2000 U.S. dollars per year (the units 
in which wages are measured).  We choose the Mexico-U.S. pair as the base since it 
involves the largest migration flow.  Of course, these estimates reflect not only direct 
monetary costs, but also the monetary value of psychic costs and source-specific 
immigration policies imposed by the destination countries. 
  Estimates for each source-destination pair in our sample are shown in an online 
appendix.  Table 9 presents estimates for the subset of source and destination countries 
that appear in the 25 source-destination pairs with the largest stocks of migrants.  Within 
each source-destination cell, the first entry is the estimated fixed migration cost.  The 
second entry is the number of emigrants from the source to the destination.   
  Table 9 illustrates a number of points.  The first is that fixed costs matter.  The US 
is the low-cost destination for all the Western Hemisphere source countries except 
Jamaica, and it receives more emigrants from those countries than any other destination.  
  At the same time, migration costs are only part of the story.  For Chinese 
emigrants, the cost of migrating to Canada and the US is about the same.  Yet many more 
go the US, presumably due to the higher wages there.  The situation is similar for German 
emigrants.  Canada, France, and the UK are all lower-cost destinations than the US, yet 
the US has more German immigrants than those three destinations combined.    37
  Finally, several entries highlight the role of history.  Germany is by far the lowest-
cost destination for Turkish emigrants, despite Turkey’s similar proximity to the other 
European countries.  The U.S. is the low-cost destination for Vietnam, despite the 
country’s proximity to Australia and colonial ties to France.  Presumably, these estimates 
reflect Germany’s labor-recruitment strategy from the 1960s, America’s post-war asylum 
policy in the 1980s, and the immigrant networks that have developed in their wake.    
  Moving from the scale of emigration to the selectivity of emigrants, Table 10 
decomposes migrant selectivity from different source countries by region and income 
level.
35  The first column gives mean selectivity of emigrants by source-region, income-
level cell.  Selectivity is the dependent variable in the selection regression, which is the 
difference in the log skill ratio between emigrants and non-migrants.  Emigrants are 
positively selected on average from all source regions.  Mean selectivity ranges from a 
high of 3.92 in low-income African countries to a low of 0.25 in the U.S. and Canada.  It 
is generally lower in the high-income countries than in low-income countries. 
  The next three columns use the regression results reported in column (2) of Table 
4 to decompose mean selectivity into components attributable to source-destination 
differences in skill-related wage differences, skill-varying migration costs, and a 
residual.
36  In Africa, migration costs account for about half of emigrant selectivity, with 
wage differences and the residual accounting for about one-quarter each.  Emigrants from 
Africa appear to be much more positively selected than wage differences alone warrant.  
                                                 
35  Low (high) income countries are those whose low-skill wage is below (above) the minimum value of 
this variable for the 15 OECD countries in the regression sample. 
36 The contribution of wage differences to selection is the mean across source countries of the destination-
source difference in high and low-skill wages times the coefficient on wages in column (2) of Table 4; the 
contribution of migration costs is the mean across source countries of the sum of the regressors in column 
(2) of Table 4, each multiplied by its corresponding coefficient estimate; and the contribution of the 
residual is the mean across source countries of the residual for the regression in column (2) of Table 4.   38
In the other low-income countries, wage differences play a larger role, accounting for 
37% of positive selection in Latin America and the Caribbean, 48% in low-income Asia, 
and 68% in Central and Eastern Europe.  In high-income countries, migration costs 
contribute strongly to positive selectivity.  Wage differences by themselves would 
actually contribute to negative selection in North America and high-income Asia and 
only modest positive selection in Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand.  Taking 
Tables 9 and 10 together, for most source countries, migration costs appear to play a 
large role in both how many individuals emigrate and which types emigrate. 
  We next ask how wage differences and skill-varying migration costs explain 
differences in mean immigrant skills among the destination countries.  The first column 
of Table 11 presents our measure of immigrant skills, which is the mean log skill ratio 
among immigrants in each destination country.  Based on this measure, the US has the 
most highly skilled immigrants on average, followed by Ireland and Canada.
37  We seek 
to explain the immigrant skill gap, defined as the difference between the mean log skill 
ratio among immigrants in the U.S. and the mean log skill ratio among immigrants in 
other destination countries.  The immigrant skill gap is reported in column (2). 
  We use the sorting regression reported in column (4) of Table 4 to carry out the 
decomposition.  The decomposition explains the immigrant skills gap as a linear 
combination of the differences in mean values of the regressors, using the regression 
                                                 
37  Other skill measures give somewhat different rankings.  For example, Canada ranks first in the share of 
immigrants with tertiary education.  The reason for the difference is that the US has a lower share of 
primary-educated immigrants than Canada.  We focus on the log skill ratio because that is the skill measure 
that follows from our model and the measure for which our regressions can provide a decomposition.     39
coefficients as weights.  To aid interpretation, we report results in the form of the share of 
the immigrant skill gap explained by each variable in the regression.
38   
  Results are reported in columns (3) through (14).  Column (3) shows that on 
average the wage difference explains 58 percent of the immigrant skill gap; in all 
destination countries it explains at least 25 percent.  In Ireland, which has a relatively 
small immigrant skill gap, it explains over 100 percent.     
  The next two columns show the importance of language.  English explains at least 
20 percent of the immigrant skill gap for each non-Anglophone destination country.  The 
role of common languages is smaller overall, but nevertheless important for some of 
those destination countries whose languages are not widely spoken elsewhere.   
  The next three columns quantify the importance of distance.  Contiguity has little 
effect.  Longitudinal differences and distance have largely offsetting effects owing to the 
differing signs of their coefficients in Table 4.  Among the policy variables, visa waivers 
and the Schengen treaty explain relatively little of the immigrant wage gap.  Asylum 
policy, in contrast, has important effects.  In seven of the destination countries, asylum 
policy explains at least 20 percent of the immigrant skill disadvantage.  In Canada and 
New Zealand, in contrast, the skills gap would be over 10 percent larger were it not for 
their relatively restrictive admissions of asylum seekers. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  Two dominant features of international labor movements are positive selection of 
individuals into migration and positive sorting of migrants across destinations.  We show 
that a simple model of income maximization can account for both phenomena.   
                                                 
38  Nothing constrains the share explained by any subset of components to be less than one.   40
  In our selection regression, we find that migrants for a source-destination pair are 
more educated relative to non-migrants, the larger is the skill-related difference in 
earnings between the destination country and the source.  That is, positive selectivity is 
stronger where the reward to skill in the destination is relatively large.  This result obtains 
for wage differences expressed in levels, but not in logs.  Log wage differences, which 
capture cross-country differences in returns to skill, fail to account for bilateral migration 
patterns because cross-country differences in returns to skill are dwarfed by cross-country 
differences in labor productivity.  On their own, cross-country differences in returns to 
skill would predict negative selection of migrants, which occurs rarely in the data. 
  Positive sorting is a general prediction of income maximization.  In our sorting 
regression, the relative stock of more-educated migrants in a destination is increasing in 
the level earnings difference between high and low-skilled workers.  This correlation is 
stronger when wage differences are adjusted for taxes, implying that migrants weigh 
post-tax earnings when choosing a destination.  The U.S. and Canada enjoy relatively 
large post-tax skill-related wage differences, which largely account for their ability to 
attract more educated migrants relative to other OECD countries. 
  In the sorting regression, we obtain qualitatively similar results when we use 
wages constructed from micro data as when we approximate wages using aggregate 
income data and impose the assumption of log normality.  As a practical matter, this 
means that one can obtain empirically meaningful estimates of skill-related wage 
differences from commonly available data sources.  The sorting regression allows one to 
test income maximization even without source-country wage data, which makes our 
approach applicable to a wide variety of settings.   41
  Our analysis also shows that language, history, and policy affect migration.  
English-speaking destinations draw higher-skilled immigrants than other destinations, 
whereas former colonial powers draw lower-skilled immigrants from their former 
colonies than from other source countries.  Destinations with liberal refugee and asylum 
policies draw relatively low-skilled immigrants, all else equal.  Unfortunately, our ability 
to say more about policy is limited by the sparseness of data allowing one to compare the 
regimes of different destination countries.  Our model provides a framework in which 
comparative analysis of immigration policies could be undertaken, but with current 
limitations in data we are limited in the analyses we can carry out.   42
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 Figure 1:  Share of emigrants and general population with tertiary education, 2000 
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Share of more educated among population
Selection of migrants, 2000Table 1:  Share of OECD immigrants by destination region and education, 2000 
    Education  Group 
  Destination Region  All  Primary Secondary Tertiary
         
         
 North  America  0.514 0.352  0.540  0.655 
         
 Europe  0.384 0.560  0.349  0.236 
         
 Australia  &  Oceania  0.102 0.088  0.111  0.109 
         
  All OECD     0.355  0.292  0.353 
 
Notes:  This table shows the share of immigrants in OECD countries by destination 
region and schooling group in 2000.  North America includes Canada, Mexico and the 
United States; Australia and Oceania includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South 
Korea; and Europe includes the other 24 OECD members (as of 2000).  
 
 
Table 2:  Share of emigrants to OECD by source country and destination region, 2000 
   Destination  region 
  Source country  All OECD  N. America  Europe  Aus. & Oceania 
 Mexico  0.113  0.219  0.001  0.000 
 UK  0.053  0.041  0.027  0.206 
 Italy  0.042  0.027  0.062  0.038 
 Germany  0.038  0.028  0.049  0.045 
 Turkey  0.035  0.003  0.085  0.005 
 India  0.030  0.038 0.023  0.018 
 China  0.030  0.039 0.009  0.066 
 Philippines  0.030  0.046  0.007  0.030 
 Vietnam  0.022  0.032  0.008  0.026 
 Portugal  0.022  0.011  0.040  0.002 
 Korea  0.021  0.025 0.002  0.075 
 Poland  0.020  0.019  0.024  0.010 
 Morocco  0.019  0.002  0.048  0.000 
 Cuba  0.015  0.028 0.002  0.000 
 Canada  0.015  0.025  0.004  0.006 
 
Note:  This table shows the share of immigrants accounted for by the 15 largest source 
countries for migrants to OECD destination countries.  
Table 3: Summary statistics for wage data 
 
A: Destination countries 
Pre-tax 
Wage: Low-skill  High-skill  Difference  N 
Source (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LIS 20.12  41.87  21.76  13 
WDI 8.18  21.9  13.71  15 
FO 15.71  26.25  10.54  12 
 
Post-tax 
wage: Low-skill  High-skill  Difference N 
Source (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
LIS 13.02  23.41  10.39  13 
WDI 5.22  12.15  6.94  15 
FO 10.03  14.56  4.54  12 
 
B: Source countries 
Pre-tax 
wage: Low-skill  High-skill  Difference N 
Source (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
WDI 2.42  6.99  4.57  102 
FO 3.97  7.67  3.71  101 
  
Table 4: Regression results from linear-utility model     
Equation: Scale  Selection  Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting 
Wage data source:  WDI  WDI  WDI  WDI  LIS  LIS 
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h − , pre-tax     0.060    0.026   
     (0.026)    (0.013)   
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h
3
h − , post-tax      0.103    0.048 
       (0.045)    (0.022) 
Anglophone  dest.  1.451 0.567 0.838 0.636 0.817 0.678 
 (0.873)  (0.183)  (0.183)  (0.256) (0.193) (0.241) 
Common  language  0.648 1.268 0.355 0.352 0.331 0.332 
 (0.293)  (0.248)  (0.137)  (0.139) (0.125) (0.124) 
Contiguous 0.880  -0.384  -1.005  -1.007  -1.108  -1.097 
 (0.401)  (0.373)  (0.229)  (0.237) (0.230) (0.240) 
Longitude  diff.  0.003 -0.009 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log distance  -1.152  0.676  -0.245  -0.259  -0.273  -0.279 
 (0.171)  (0.131)  (0.092)  (0.097) (0.107) (0.111) 
LT colonial rel.  2.159  -0.711  -0.391  -0.445  -0.505  -0.550 
 (0.411)  (0.193)  (0.176)  (0.161) (0.150) (0.137) 
ST colonial rel.  2.641  -0.395  -0.129  -0.187  -0.195  -0.224 
 (0.601)  (0.431)  (0.256)  (0.257) (0.276) (0.276) 
Visa  waiver  0.589 -0.299 0.335 0.364 0.440 0.471 
 (0.314)  (0.135)  (0.164)  (0.172) (0.200) (0.203) 
Schengen  sig.  0.058 0.402 0.430 0.403 0.528 0.507 
 (0.337)  (0.166)  (0.250)  (0.252) (0.295) (0.304) 
Asylee  share  -1.221 -2.512 -3.590 -3.635 -3.998 -4.007 
 (3.698)  (0.818)  (0.901)  (0.709) (0.929) (0.810) 
Observations  2786 1393 1393 1393 1214 1214 
R-squared 0.44  0.47  0.61  0.61  0.63  0.63 
Clusters  15 15 15 15 13 13 
        
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the variables shown, all regressions 
include a dummy variable equal to one if the destination-country statistical office explicitly codes a 
primary education category.  The scale regression also includes a dummy equal to one for the 
tertiary skill-group observations and interactions between that dummy and all variables shown.  The 
sorting regressions include a full set of source-country dummies. Table 5: Regression results from log-utility model     
Equation: Scale  Selection  Sorting Sorting Sorting Sorting 
Wage data source:  WDI  WDI  WDI  WDI  LIS  LIS 
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h δ − δ     -1.307      
    (0.186)      
3
h δ , pre-tax     3.929    5.338   
     (0.767)    (0.886)   
3
h δ , post-tax      3.342    4.146 
       (0.761)    (1.297) 
Anglophone  dest.  1.466       
  (0.857)       
Common  language  1.315       
  (0.213)       
Contiguous  0.656       
  (0.301)       
Longitude  diff.  -0.008       
  (0.003)       
Log  distance  -0.530       
  (0.180)       
LT  colonial  rel.  1.912       
  (0.485)       
ST colonial rel.  2.185           
  (0.413)       
Visa  waiver  -0.793       
  (0.259)       
Schengen  sig.  -0.523       
  (0.350)       
Asylee  share  -2.065       
  (3.257)       
Observations  2786 1393 1393 1393 1214 1214 
R-squared 0.29  0.17  0.40  0.38  0.43  0.38 
Clusters  15 15 15 15 13 13 
        
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to the variables shown, all regressions 
include a dummy variable equal to one if the destination-country statistical office explicitly codes a 
primary education category.  The sorting also regressions include a full set of source-country 
dummies. Table 6: Key wage coefficients based on alternative wage measures 
 
A. WDI wages,  
PPP-adjusted 
  
Equation: Selection  Sorting 
Variable (1)  (2) 







h − − −   0.108  
 (0.016)   
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax   0.082 
   (0.054) 
Observations 1379  1379 
R-squared 0.50  0.60 
Clusters 15  15 
    
B. LIS wages, PPP adjusted    
Equation: Selection  Sorting 
Variable (1)  (2) 
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax   0.047 
   (0.024) 
Observations   1202 
R-squared   0.63 
Clusters    
    
C. Freeman-Oostendorp wages    
Equation: Selection  Sorting 
Variable (1)  (2) 







h − − −   0.082  
 (0.016)   
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax   0.072 
   (0.045) 
Observations 1093  1093 
R-squared 0.49  0.63 
Clusters 12  12 
    
D. Freeman-Oostendorp wages, 
PPP-adjusted 
  
Equation: Selection  Sorting 
Variable (1)  (2) 







h − − −   0.064  
 (0.011)   
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax   0.091 
   (0.039) 
Observations 1059  1059 
R-squared 0.49  0.64 
Clusters 12  12 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all 
regressions include all variable shown or discussed in the note to Table 4. 
 Table 7: Additional 
Selection and Sorting 
Regressions 
           
Equation:  Selection Sorting  Sorting Selection Sorting  Sorting Selection Sorting  Sorting  Sorting  Sorting 
Wage  data  source:  WDI  WDI LIS WDI  WDI LIS WDI  WDI LIS WDI LIS 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11) 







h − − −   0.065    0.078    0.082        
  (0.013)    (0.012)    (0.012)        
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax   0.121  0.052  0.127  0.058  0.121  0.068  0.106  0.050 
   (0.054)  (0.025)  (0.053)  (0.015)  (0.047)  (0.019)  (0.039)  (0.018) 
Relative  university  quality      0.000  -0.002  -0.004       
      (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)       
Log  emigrant  stock  1990         -0.148  -0.039  -0.157    
         (0.031)  (0.055)  (0.058)    
Observations  1393 1393 1214 1348 1348 1169  963  963  823  2338 2044 
R-squared  0.40 0.57 0.57 0.49 0.63 0.65 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.59 0.62 
Clusters  15 15 13 14 14 12 15 15 13 15 13 
             
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all regressions include all variables shown or discussed in the note to Table 4.  
Columns (1)-(3) report regressions in which we redefine skilled migrants to be migrants with either secondary or tertiary education; columns (4)-(9) differ from 
the corresponding regressions in Table 4 only by in the inclusion of the indicated regressor; and columns (10) and (11) re-estimate the sorting regression using 
the full sample of source-destination pairs for which destination wage data are available. Table 8: Wage coefficients from selection and sorting regressions from samples that omit one destination 
 
A. Selection regressions; WDI wage measures             
Omitted destination  AUS  AUT  CAN  DEU  DNK  ESP FIN FRA  GBR IRL NLD  NOR  NZL  SWE  USA 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (15)  (16) 







h − − −   0.066 0.071 0.068 0.071 0.078 0.078 0.072 0.075 0.072 0.079 0.074 0.066 0.067 0.074 0.073 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
Observations  1296 1294 1294 1303 1299 1298 1306 1293 1293 1348 1293 1295 1301 1292 1297 
R-squared  0.47 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.44 
Clusters  14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
 
B. Sorting regressions; WDI post-tax wage measures             
Omitted destination  AUS  AUT  CAN  DEU  DNK  ESP FIN FRA GBR IRL NLD  NOR NZL SWE  USA 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (15)  (16) 
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax  0.094 0.110 0.112 0.111 0.122 0.112 0.113 0.103 0.108 0.141 0.112 0.080 0.095 0.134 0.122 
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.054) 
Observations  2166 2175 2170 2206 2180 2176 2204 2161 2152 2287 2156 2177 2178 2160 2184 
R-squared  0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.38 
Clusters  14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
 
C. Sorting regressions; LIS post-tax wage measures             
Omitted destination  AUS  AUT  CAN  DEU  DNK ESP FRA GBR IRL NLD NOR SWE USA     
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)     
) W W ( 1
h
3
h − , post-tax 
 
0.031 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.055 0.051 0.047 0.052 0.067 0.051 0.037 0.055 0.071     
  (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.033)     
Observations  1872 1881 1876 1912 1886 1882 1867 1858 1993 1862 1883 1866 1890     
R-squared  0.43 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.40     
Clusters  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12     
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  In addition to variables shown, all regressions include all variable shown or discussed in the note to Table 4.  
Table 9: Fixed migration costs and migrant stocks for selected source and destination countries 
Destination: 
Source 
Australia Canada  France Germany  UK  US 
Canada 59.94    53.84  48.66  33.7  10.6 
 21,375    8,910  7,998  49,954  715,825 
China 80.28  56.8  90.83  88.57  87.73  55.6 
 117,170  287,820  24,547  26,069  33,380  841,699 
Colombia  89.88  69.4 72.84 71.72 71.43 34.67 
 3,083  11,725  6,136  5,895  8,928  402,935 
Dominican  Republic  133.45 62.58 90.62 59.85 95.37  6.62 
 38  3,225  238  3,188  350  527,520 
El  Salvador  50.52 26.82 83.06 82.21 89.85 -0.16 
 6,314  27,780  328  332  302  619,185 
Germany 34.69  19.94  14.8    13.76  21.83 
 102,219  163,880  109,425    164,165  646,815 
Guatemala  105.82 45.01 83.78 80.14 96.95  8.86 
 157  8,880  346  448  212  341,590 
Ireland  19.66 22.87 34.63 13.76  -28.28 16.55 
 45,365  24,520  3,845  13,284  420,102  148,680 
Italy  27.4 14.95 13.37 10.91 31.34  23.3 
  216,316 312,185 371,714 456,000  86,876 461,085 
Jamaica  76.79 -1.73 67.18 51.03 -9.31 -2.98 
  680 103,265  299  872 124,313 449,795 
Korea,  Rep.  66.14 48.94 73.86  60.2 72.08 29.06 
 25,160  50,860  6,164  12,226  7,434  676,640 
Mexico 117.03  59.6  90.46  82.5  90.62  0 
 870  24,795  3,064  4,029  3,558  6,374,825 
Philippines  65.41 46.64 83.42 68.31 67.99 29.58 
 78,105  191,615  4,767  12,539  34,782  1,163,555 
Poland  45.63 26.38 27.95  5.21 42.89 29.83 
  52,887 154,525  91,122 198,000  33,661 399,165 
Portugal 46.13  9.32  -2.55  8.81  31.08  19.23 
  13,329 143,145 538,106 113,216  26,006 187,645 
Spain  66.39 63.67 15.77 27.11 42.88 50.85 
 11,972  9,695  308,500  109,613  40,592  73,835 
Turkey  63.17 68.03  40.1  7.95 53.27 60.36 
  26,160 13,045  133,890  1,272,000 36,754 64,780 
United Kingdom  12.39  11.87  23.02  17.29    36.99 
 966,139  580,250  61,317  90,000    613,930 
Vietnam  39.56 31.02 38.45 45.46 61.75 21.01 
 128,666  127,590  58,570  43,105  19,137  807,305 
Note: Top figure in each cell is fixed migration cost in 000s of annual 2000 USD; bottom figure is emigrant stock.Table 10:  Decomposition of emigrant selectivity, by income level and region of 
source country 
    Mean   Mean contribution to selectivity of 
Source countries  selectivity  Wage difference Migration  costs  Residual 
Low income countries in:         
Africa 3.918  0.955  2.014  0.950 
Latin America & Car.  2.286  0.842  1.476  -0.033 
Asia 1.982  0.949  1.352  -0.319 
Cen. & E. Europe  1.265  0.862  0.864  -0.461 
Australia/Oceania --  --  --  -- 
        
High income countries in:         
Africa --  --  --  -- 
North America  0.249  -0.210  1.393  -0.935 
Asia 1.190  -0.038  1.333  -0.105 
Western Europe  1.067  0.048  0.884  0.135 
Australia & N. Zealand  0.891  0.193  1.479  -0.781 
        
All countries  1.991  0.664  1.327  0.000 
 
Notes:  The table shows the mean value for the selection variable across source countries 
in column (1) (the log odds of migration for those with tertiary education relative to the 
log odds of migration for those with primary education), the mean value of the 
contribution of wage differences to selection in column (2), the mean value of the 
contribution of migration costs to selection in column (3), and the mean value of the 
residual in column (4).  The relevant regression results are those in column (2) of Table 4.  
Low (high) income countries are those whose wage for low skill workers is below 
(above) the minimum value of this variable for OECD countries in the regression sample.  
Table 11: Decomposition of the immigrant skills gap  











































Australia 1.29  0.72  0.84  0.00  -0.01 -0.03  -0.16  0.22  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 0.00  -0.07 0.78 
Austria -0.54  2.55  0.36  0.25  0.03  0.02  0.07 -0.08  0.00 0.00  -0.04 -0.02  0.39  0.98 
Canada 1.30  0.71  0.99  0.00  -0.06 -0.02  0.00  0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.04 0.00  -0.13 0.76 
Denmark -0.51  2.52  0.28  0.25  0.04  0.00  0.07 -0.07  0.00 0.00  -0.04 -0.02  0.36  0.87 
Finland -0.75  2.76  0.38  0.23 0.03  0.00  0.07  -0.06  0.00  0.00 -0.04  -0.02  0.09  0.68 
France -0.10  2.11  0.44  0.30  0.02  0.02  0.08  -0.08 0.02  0.00  -0.05  -0.02  0.22  0.96 
Germany -0.31  2.32  0.44  0.27  0.03  0.03  0.08 -0.09  0.00 0.00  -0.05 -0.03  0.05  0.76 
Ireland 1.39  0.62  1.52  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.27  -0.37  -0.01  0.00  -0.31 0.00 0.83 1.95 
Netherlands -0.54 2.55  0.32  0.25 0.03  0.00  0.07  -0.07  0.00  0.00 -0.04  -0.02  0.55  1.10 
New 
Zealand 0.71  1.30  0.64  0.00  0.00 -0.02  -0.13  0.14  0.00  0.00  -0.04 0.00  -0.26 0.32 
Norway 1.15  0.86  0.53  0.74  0.10 0.01  0.21  -0.17  -0.01  0.00 -0.12  -0.06  0.40  1.64 
Spain -0.03  2.04  0.50  0.31  0.02 0.00  0.08  -0.06  0.03  0.00 -0.05  -0.03  -0.06  0.74 
Sweden 0.28  1.73  0.55  0.37  0.05  0.00  0.11  -0.09 0.00  0.00  -0.06  -0.03  0.36  1.27 
United 
Kingdom  0.40 1.61 0.35  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.10  -0.09  0.07  0.00  -0.06 0.00 0.22 0.58 
United 
States  2.01  0.00                     
Mean 0.38  1.63  0.58  0.21  0.02  0.00  0.07  -0.06 0.01  0.00  -0.07  -0.02  0.21  0.96 
 
Note: Results are based on the model reported in column (4) of Table 4. 